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PREFACE 
he draft road map of 20 December 2002 annexed to this paper was prepared during the 
last months of 2002 by the Quartet, consisting of the EU, Russia, US and UN. This 
text was due to be published before the year end, but with the Israeli general elections 
due on 28 January 2003 the US insisted on delaying its publication. A few days before the 
beginning of the Iraq war in March 2003, President Bush announced that the road map would 
be published as soon as Abu Mazen was installed as Prime Minister of the Palestinian 
Authority. The text had however already been long in public circulation (see, for example, the 
website of the Israeli NGO called Bitter Lemons at www.bitterlemons.org/docs.html). 
The present paper is extracted from Chapters 4 and 7, and Annex N, of the authors’ book 
published by CEPS and completed on 16 February 2003, under the title The Rubik Cube of the 
Wider Middle East. The only addition has been the map entitled “West Bank ‘Security Wall’: 
Under Construction and Projected Alignment”, which was distributed by the Negotiation 
Affairs Department of the PLO on 25 March 2003.  
It is a matter for speculation and eventual clarification whether something like this map might 
be what Israel has in mind for the provisional borders of the interim Palestinian state under 
Phase II of the road map, if indeed the process reaches that stage. This map represents around 
40-50% of the total territory of the West Bank occupied in the 1967 war, and compares with 
the 94% under discussion at Taba in January 2001.  
 
Michael Emerson 
Nathalie Tocci 
14 April 2003, Brussels 
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Birth of the Quartet and its road map 
The Quartet was born at a meeting of foreign ministers in Madrid in April 2002, in response 
to Israeli army incursions into the Palestinian territories and in an attempt to give a fresh 
impetus to Western efforts to revive the lapsed Middle East peace process. The Quartet 
consists of the EU, Russia, the US and the United Nations. Given the relative passivity of the 
Russian and UN participants, the Quartet is effectively being driven by the US and the EU. 
While not yet successful in re-activating the peace process, it confirms in principle for the EU 
for the first time since the end of the Clinton period that the peace process is no longer the 
exclusive domain of the US, and that the US appears to welcome a more active European role 
as a political player, rather than just a payer of aid.  
Since President Bush’s speech of 24 June 2002, the Quartet has been especially engaged in 
the question of Palestinian reform. It has sponsored an International Task Force on Palestinian 
Reform, which includes the four Quartet members, joined by Canada, Japan, Norway, the 
IMF and the World Bank. The Task Force has set up seven working groups, tasked with civil 
society, financial accountability, local government, the market economy, elections and 
judicial and administrative reform. The Quartet is also meeting with the Arab League’s 
Follow-up Committee, consisting of Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia and joined now by 
Lebanon and Syria.  
Since the summer of 2002, the Quartet has also been busy working on the concept of a road 
map for a renewed peace process. The first draft road map adopted by the Quartet on 17 
September was based on a text proposed by the Danish EU presidency, which was heavily 
influenced by the speech of President Bush on 24 June and subsequent discussions in the 
Quartet. The main features of the road map of 17 September were a three-stage process that 
should deliver the final settlement within three years, i.e. by 2005. Compliance with specific 
performance benchmarks would be monitored by the Quartet. The three stages had the 
following main features: 
I. 2002 to first half of 2003: Cessation of violence, security reform, settlement freeze, Israeli 
withdrawal to the pre-intifada (28 September 2000) lines “as the security situation improves”, 
and Palestinian elections in early 2003. 
II. Second half of 2003: Creation of a Palestinian state with provisional borders. 
III. 2004-05: Israeli-Palestinian negotiations leading to a permanent status solution.  
The Quartet’s paper work has been impressive and its inception creates the potential for a 
valuable multilateral framework for the resolution of the Middle East conflict. Yet so far, as  E MERSON AND TOCCI 
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expressed by Commissioner Patten himself, its work has been “virtual”. With Israel’s military 
occupation of the West Bank and the Palestinian Authority (PA) barely kept alive by foreign 
donations, much of the Quartet’s work is at best theoretical. At worst it may be 
counterproductive in undermining the credibility of the process. The road map has been 
through several stages of revision throughout the last months of 2002, resulting in the draft of 
20 December (annexed to this Working Paper). Although this text is widely available 
publicly, the US has refused to adopt and publish it officially, ceding to pressure from Sharon 
on grounds that it would interfere with the Israeli elections of 28 January 2003. So far the 
Quartet in action has not really marked a break from the past. As will be analysed in more 
detail below, its road map is ambiguous, providing multilateral cover for a weak US policy.  
Assessment of the road map 
The Quartet’s draft road map of 20 December 2002 has many of the necessary elements for 
progress towards a just solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – an end to violence in all its 
forms, a freeze of settlement activity and Israeli withdrawal, reform of Palestinian 
governance, security cooperation, commitment to a two-state solution and birth of a sovereign 
Palestinian state, and successive international conferences to negotiate solutions and final 
status settlements between Israel and Palestine as well as with Syria and Lebanon (see Box 1). 
Box 1. Checkpoints in the draft road map of 20 December 2002 
Palestinians 
1. Cessation of violence 
2. Reform of governance, elections 
3. Security sector reform and cooperation with Israel 
4. Declaration of right of Israel to exist 
5. Declaration of sovereign statehood 
Israel 
1. Cessation of violence, destruction, collective punishment 
2. Transfer of Palestinian tax revenues   
3. Cessation of all settlement activity 
4. Withdrawal of occupation to the pre-September 28, 2000 situation 
5. Declaration of right of Palestinian state to exist 
Bilateral/multilateral 
1. Agreement by Quartet on the road map 
2. Monitoring 
3. Recognition of the Palestinian state, with provisional borders 
4. Final status: “based on” UN resolutions and Beirut declaration 
5. Final status details 
       - Exact borders and settlements 
       - Jerusalem holy places 
       - Refugees 
       - Security regime 
       - Water 
6. Agreements with Lebanon and Syria 
  7. Multilateral regional initiative 
Source: Extracted from draft Quartet road map of 20 December 2002 (see Annex 1).   R OAD MAPS AND FINAL DESTINAIONS FOR ISRAEL AND PALESTINE 
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All this would be well and good if the stages of the road map were soundly balanced as 
between the two parties, and supported by the Quartet with adequate mechanisms of 
implementation and enforcement to guard against default by either party. But sequencing, 
substance and enforcement are key to a road map intended to provide the mechanisms to exit 
from violence and proceed to a settlement. These issues are not adequately handled in the 
draft of 20 December 2002. While some useful revisions were made compared to the October 
draft, it still has flaws that are likely to lead to its failure, and these become evident in a closer 
look at the sequencing of actions through the three phases (see Box 2). 
Settlements freeze brought into Phase I. An essential improvement in the draft road map of 20 
December, compared to the October version, is the bringing forward of the freeze in Israeli 
settlement construction or expansion to Phase I. Settlements are the most vivid manifestation 
of the occupation as well as the most evident signal to the Palestinians of the Israeli 
unwillingness to allow a viable Palestinian state. The continuation of settlement construction, 
including “natural growth”, during Phase I would seriously undermine Palestinian trust in 
Israel and the international community and so would reduce the likelihood of a cessation of 
Palestinian violence. It would also raise further the political and economic costs of a final 
settlement based on the 1967 borders.  
Other key requirements are also rightly shifted to Phase I, such as the need for Israel to ease 
travel of PA officials, the transfer of withheld revenues to the PA, easing of conditions 
affecting the humanitarian crisis (curfews, checkpoints) and the end of illegal actions such as 
attacks on civilians, the destruction or confiscation of property and deportations (effectively 
the respect of international humanitarian law – IHL). 
Withdrawal to 28 September 2000 lines unclear. The draft road map says this would occur “as 
comprehensive security performance moves forward”. This makes the road map vulnerable to 
sabotage by an Israeli government that did not intend to end the occupation and progress to a 
viable two-state solution. Concern for this risk is warranted, since Prime Minister Sharon 
currently advocates only an interim cantonised Palestinian “state” in less than half of the West 
Bank, and has a track record of provoking Palestinian violence (e.g. the visit to the Al Aqsa 
mosque in September 2000, IDF escalation since then).  
The PA cannot yet be considered a state actor. It is a nascent and to a large extent crippled 
authority only marginally capable of governing a population, since the occupation prevents 
even the movement of Palestinians outside small localities. Palestinian commitments to 
prepare for democratic statehood and to end violence are imperative both as a direct 
contribution to a peace settlement and as an indirect contribution, through the effect this could 
have on the Israeli public. However, demands made on the PA should be commensurate with 
its capabilities. Given the weakness of the PA and its dependence upon the international 
community, the latter is prone to accept any conditions imposed upon them. However, 
pressuring the PA to accept obligations that it cannot fulfil will only further erode the 
confidence of Israeli and international public opinion. The road map should thus distinguish 
more carefully between those conditions that can and should be met by the PA immediately, 
those that could be met following the easing of Israeli occupation, and those that could only 
be taken with the support of the international community. Specific reforms in the security 
services and to some extent in the finance and judicial sectors are important to bring an end of 
Palestinian violence. Other more general demands (e.g. elections, governance, constitution 
and institution-building) are part of the long-term process of state-building. While this does 
not argue for their postponement, it does suggest that they should not be made preconditions 
of a peace process.  E MERSON AND TOCCI 
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Box 2. Sequencing of the draft road map of 20 December 2002  
Phase I. Present-May 2003 – Ending violence and building Palestinian institutions 
Start 
-  Palestinian declaration of Israel’s right to exist 
-  Palestinian cessation of violence against Israelis 
-  Israeli support for the Palestinian state 
-  Israeli cessation of violence against Palestinians 
Security 
-  Palestinian security apparatus rebuilt, aided by the US, Egypt and Jordan 
-  Palestinian action against terrorism 
-  Israel refrains from undermining trust (destruction of property, etc.) 
-  Israel withdraws occupation to 28 September 2000 situation, “as security performance improves” 
-  Quartet begins informal monitoring 
Palestinian institution-building 
-  Preparation of constitution and elections, interim prime minister appointed 
-  Judicial, financial, administrative reforms 
-  Israel facilitates travel of Palestinians for above purposes 
-  Palestinian elections as soon as possible 
Humanitarian: Implement Bertini report, easing constraints on delivery of external aid 
Civil society: Donor support 
Settlements 
-  Israel dismantles illegal outposts 
-  Israel freezes construction/expansion, including natural growth 
Phase II. June 2003-December 2003 – Transition 
Start: Upon consensus judgement of Quartet and after Palestinian elections 
First international conference 
-  Convened by Quartet to launch process  
-  Leading to Palestinian state with provisional borders 
-  Aiming at comprehensive peace (viz. Syria and Lebanon) 
-  Reviving multilateral regional cooperation (Madrid process) 
Palestinian reforms: New constitution; security performance continued 
Palestinian state 
-  Created through process of Israeli-Palestinian engagement  
-  With provisional borders having maximum territorial contiguity 
-  Quartet promotes recognition with “possible” UN membership 
Monitoring: Enhanced with support of Quartet 
Phase III. 2004-2005 – Permanent agreement, end of conflict 
Start: Upon consensus judgement of Quartet, at beginning of 2004 
Second international conference 
-  To endorse provisional borders 
-  To launch final status negotiations (borders, refugees, Jerusalem and settlements)  
-  To support progress for comprehensive peace (viz. Syria and Lebanon) 
Palestinian reforms: Ongoing 
Final agreement 
-  In 2005, based on UN resolutions, ending occupation begun in 1967 
-  Settlement with Syria and Lebanon 
-  Normalisation of Arab-Israeli relations 
Source: Extracted from draft Quartet road map of 20 December 2002 (Annex 1).  R OAD MAPS AND FINAL DESTINAIONS FOR ISRAEL AND PALESTINE 
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Back-loaded on final status issues. Learning from the deficiencies of Oslo, it is critical to be 
able to see what “map” will prevail at the end of the “road”. As argued by Henry Siegman
1 in 
a recent article: “the most important reason for the collapse of the Oslo Accords and of 
subsequent initiatives – the Mitchell Report, the Tenet proposals, the Zinni mission – was 
their failure to spell out what the Palestinians would get at the end of the process. Oslo was 
clear about what Israel expected to gain, and not just by the end of Oslo’s five-year term but 
immediately – security. Palestinians had to renounce immediately and unconditionally any 
recourse to violence in pursuit of their objectives….The Oslo Accords obligated Israel to 
engage in negotiations of final status issues, but the accords provided no hint as to what 
Palestinians had a right to expect as an outcome of those negotiations.”  
The current draft road map says that the final settlement would be “based on”, inter alia, 
UNSC resolutions and the Beirut Arab League declaration. Better than Oslo, it also explicitly 
calls for the establishment of “an independent, democratic and viable Palestinian state living 
side by side in peace and security with Israel and its other neighbours”. Yet by simply stating 
that a settlement will “end the occupation that began in 1967”, the Quartet does not take any 
meaningful position on the basic contours of a settlement, given that any reference to 
“territories” in the English version of UNSC resolution 242 (as opposed to the Arabic, French, 
Russian and Spanish versions) has been interpreted by Prime Minister Sharon as meaning 
some rather than all of the land occupied in 1967.
2 The December draft of the road map also 
mentions some principles regarding settlements over Jerusalem and refugee issues, but these 
could be made more substantive. As far as refugees are concerned, the international 
community could add to Resolution 181 the idea that refugee rights should be recognised and 
implemented either through return or compensation, accounting for the fundamental needs 
and interests of the refugees, the principal parties and the host countries. Regarding 
Jerusalem, the quartet could add its support for the Clinton parameters concerning the sharing 
of the city.  
Monitoring. The December 20
th draft specifies that in the first phase “relying on existing 
mechanisms and on the ground resources, Quartet representatives begin informal monitoring 
and consult with the parties on establishment of a formal monitoring mechanism and 
implementation”. Informal monitoring may be better than none, but if the Quartet is 
determined to make the road map succeed, then the establishment of a monitoring mechanism 
should be a first order priority and could be included in the list of commitments at the outset 
of Phase I. Important questions should be immediately addressed. How would the Quartet 
monitoring mechanism operate, which and how many international officials would be present 
on the ground and what would be their precise mandate? The Quartet should prepare a role for 
armed observers or peacekeepers, particularly to parallel the withdrawal of Israeli forces from 
the occupied territories in Phase I and the evacuation of settlements in stages II and III.  
Enforcement. How might the international community strengthen the incentives for the parties 
to comply with their obligations? How should the international community react to non-
compliance by one side? Would this justify non-compliance by the other? What would be the 
international reaction if non-compliance by one side was deliberately hampered by the 
actions/inactions of the other? In a recent commentary, PLC member Hanan Ashrawi argues 
that “…the process becomes subject to an endless reservoir of Israeli preconditions that are 
                                                 
1 See H. Siegman, ‘A Map without a destination’, International Herald Tribune, 30 October 2002. 
2 See section 4.4 of The Rubik Cube of the Wider Middle East on the different language versions of UNSC 242, 
and Annex G.   E MERSON AND TOCCI 
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essentially impossible to fulfil, given the fact that Israel can pursue a policy of destroying 
precisely those conditions that would allow Palestinian compliance”.
3  
As signatories to the Fourth Geneva Convention, third states have a duty and consequently a 
right to intervene in the event of clear violations of international humanitarian law using the 
full range of non-military foreign policy instruments available to them. These would include 
the judicious yet effective suspension of economic aid or cooperation agreements (or aspects 
of those agreements such as MEDA and budgetary aid to the PA, trade preferences, public 
procurement, scientific cooperation with Israel). Of fundamental importance would be the 
conditioning of US aid to Israel upon respect of its obligations under the road map (as pointed 
out above, Israel has a request for $14 billion of aid from the US currently pending).  
An accelerated road map 
The draft road map of 20 December 2002 is still a hugely complex construction. Judging by 
the current political will of the principal and third parties and the ongoing developments on 
the ground, it has small chances of success. What developments, in the region and the 
international community, could open opportunities either for a faster and surer way forward?  
-  Palestinian shift from the militarised intifada to non-violent resistance? A first 
opportunity might arise with a Palestinian acceptance of an unconditional end to violence 
against any Israeli targets along the lines proposed by the intra-Palestinian ceasefire talks 
in Cairo facilitated by Egypt. This could emerge with a continuation of dialogue between 
Palestinian political factions with Arab and European mediation. It could be spurred by 
changing public opinion in Palestine and a declining support for the armed intifada. 
According to a poll commissioned by Search for Common Ground, 72% of Palestinians 
are willing to embrace non-violent resistance to the Israeli occupation.
4 However, so far a 
unilateral Palestinian ceasefire, without being matched by Israeli commitments, appears 
unlikely.  
-  Policy change in Israel? The election of 28 January returned Prime Minister Sharon to 
power, with an impressive personal victory, yet still faced with the hazards of coalition-
building. With enhanced personal authority at the beginning of his second and no doubt 
last term of office, Sharon may well want to become the man who settled the conflict once 
and for all. The question would be how, noticing his dismissive remarks about the road 
map and his plans for a truncated “Palestinian state”. However there remains a latent 
majority favouring a just peace. According to the same poll reported above, 72% of Israeli 
Jews would accept a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders if Palestinians would stop 
violence.  
-  More substantive peace plans from Europe and/or Arabs? The EU and the leading Arab 
states could further strengthen these tendencies by promoting more explicit and 
substantive proposals both for solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and for fleshing out 
the Beirut Declaration in the context of a new Wider Middle East initiative (ideas for 
which are suggested below).  
-  Change in the US policy, post-Iraq crisis. The US conception of the road map, largely 
reflected in the draft of 20 December 2002, represents the maximum the US felt able to 
promote without entering into sharp disagreement with Israel. After a resolution of the 
Iraqi crisis, however, the US could adopt a more pro-active position. The Iraq crisis 
                                                 
3 H. Ashrawi (2002), Roadmap, 28 October, (www.MIFTAH.org). 
4 H. Amr, ‘When non-violent majorities don’t count’, International Herald Tribune, 4 February 2003.  R OAD MAPS AND FINAL DESTINAIONS FOR ISRAEL AND PALESTINE 
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should surely have raised US awareness of its need to improve its reputation in the 
Arab/Islamic world, without which its war against Al Qaeda is undermined. Some 
combination of the other possible movements described – in Palestinian and Israeli 
politics and EU and/or Arab diplomatic initiatives – could tip the balance of arguments 
among US policy-makers. Indeed, already Secretary of State Powell speaks of putting 
more drive behind the road map “soon after Iraq”. 
Outline for an accelerated road map. Supposing some combination of events might re-open 
the peace process, how might they be translated into an accelerated and surer implementation 
of the objectives of the road map? An outline might be as follows (Box 3 summarises): 
-  Start with passing of a new UNSC resolution strengthening the legitimacy of the Quartet’s 
leadership of the peace process, clarify past UNSC resolutions on the occupied territories, 
give more substance to the principles for the final status, and outline international 
monitoring, peacekeeping and enforcement mechanisms. 
-  On the key issue of the future map of the Palestinian state, there is no legitimate basis 
except a clarified reference to the 1967 green line, leaving open adjustments to this 
frontier with the aid of minor mutually agreed land swaps. 
-  The Quartet would be mandated to organise a comprehensive and coordinated structure of 
monitoring, peacekeeping, security cooperation and assistance of all kinds (humanitarian, 
economic, governance). This international regime in the future Palestinian state would be 
a  sui generis model, reflecting Palestinian realities and thus would not replicate any 
particular experience.
5 However the international community would take up critical 
responsibilities during the transition, as Israeli forces are withdrawn. There will be risks in 
such an operation, but that will be a natural reflection of the present impossibility of the 
two parties to manage a peace process bilaterally.  
-  Quartet parties would be authorised to take appropriate measures, such as suspending 
economic aid or cooperation agreements, in the event of grave default by either of the 
parties in their obligations. Such measures could not be automatic, however, and would 
have to be judged in the light of the political context.  
-  The process of international conferences would be more front-loaded with substantive 
outlines of the final peace agreement and the recognition of Palestinian statehood. 
Box 3. Proposals for an accelerated road map  
1.  New UNSC Resolution, proposed by the Quartet (or the EU), sets out principles of a 
settlement, immediate obligations, and conditions for international monitoring and 
enforcement 
2.  Principles 
•  The establishment of a Palestinian state along the borders of 1967 and the evacuation of 
all Israeli settlements within the Palestinian state, but allowing for negotiated 1-for-1 land 
swaps in adjusting the green line 
•  East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine and endorsement of the Clinton parameters for 
the sharing of Jerusalem 
                                                 
5 The cases of Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan have been important experiences. But, by comparison with 
Bosnia and Afghanistan, Palestine will be a much more homogeneous state, and unlike Kosovo its state 
sovereignty will not be in question. Hence, an international protectorate of the kind seen in Bosnia or Kosovo is 
unlikely, even if some Israelis argue for this. With the withdrawal of Israeli forces, however, there will be a need 
for a separating force provided by the international community.   E MERSON AND TOCCI 
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•  A just and realistic solution to the refugee problem, reconciling the principle of the right 
of return with Israel’s concerns. 
3. Immediate  obligations 
Palestinian Authority 
1. Enforcement of the cessation of violence 
2. Reaffirmation of the right of Israel to exist 
3. Reform of governance  
4. Security sector reform and lawful cooperation with Israel 
5. Preparation of constitution and elections 
Israel 
1. Respect for IHL in the conduct of the occupation (including an end to all 
  settlement activity, violence, destruction and collective punishment) 
2. Declaration of the right of the Palestinian state to exist on the WBGS (West Bank and 
 Gaza  Strip) 
3. Transfer of Palestinian tax revenues 
4. Redeployment to the 28 September 2000 lines 
5. Assumption of responsibility of the human welfare of the population 
  in areas remaining under occupation 
4. Quartet  monitoring and peacekeeping 
-  International presence with Special Representative for coordination of: 
-  Monitoring of performance and conduct of parties 
-  Technical assistance for governance reforms 
-  Conditional macroeconomic assistance 
-  Humanitarian assistance 
-  Police/security support unit 
-  Military peacekeeping force 
5.  Symmetrical conditionality by members of the Quartet  
  If either the Palestinian Authority or Israel defaults on its obligations, Quartet parties may 
take appropriate measures, including reducing or suspending economic assistance and/or 
cooperation/association agreements. Quartet supports implementation by PA where 
needed.  
6. First  international  conference 
-  Recognise new UNSC Resolution on principles 
-  Agree immediate start to withdrawal from settlements, e.g. all of Gaza and maximum 
contiguity of Palestinian communities in the West Bank  
-  Agree Palestinian statehood 
-  Agree international presence 
7.  Second international conference 
-  Revive regional cooperation working groups 
-  Begin negotiations on refugees 
-  Begin negotiations on Lebanon and Syria 
8.  Third international conference  
-  Conclude final status negotiations  R OAD MAPS AND FINAL DESTINAIONS FOR ISRAEL AND PALESTINE 
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Final destinations 
During final status talks between Camp David and Taba, significant progress was made on 
several important dossiers, most notably borders, settlements and Jerusalem. Positions have 
diverged since, with Israeli leaders stressing frequently that “Taba is no longer on the table”, 
whereas the Beirut declaration of the Arab states of 28 March 2002 and the Palestinian non-
paper of 12 June 2002 are explicit about the 4 June 1967 armistice “green line” being the only 
basis for negotiation.  
However the achievements of those last months of the peace process up to Taba in January 
2001 appear to be the only logical place to start, if and when final status talks resume. The 
content of this legacy has been thoroughly presented in recent documents of the International 
Crisis Group, with some updating and filling in of missing elements.
6 For the most part we 
can refer to this work, but feel the need to try to go further with respect to the refugee 
question, which was the least close to solution.  
Settlements and borders. Much has been written about the Camp David II negotiations of 
July 2000 and the ensuing talks up to Taba in January 2001.
7 Apparently no map was on the 
table at the Camp David talks, but approximate maps have been drawn up reflecting the 
discussions. What emerges from the literature is that while Barak’s offers at Camp David 
went beyond those of any other Israeli leader before him, they did not amount to a viable 
Palestinian state along the 1967 borders. Israel would have annexed approximately 8% of the 
West Bank, including 97 Palestinian villages (370,000 people). Most important, the 
annexation of settlement blocs from Jerusalem across to Jericho and the Jordan valley, and 
further north from Ariel to Shilo would have effectively cut the West Bank into three 
Palestinian cantons, adding of course the separation from the Gaza Strip as a fourth. The 
Israeli proposals excluded Palestinian effective control over their borders, given insistence on 
continuing Israeli presence along the Jordan river border.  
The Clinton parameters and the negotiations between Camp David and Taba progressed 
significantly on the question of borders and settlements. Israel accepted Palestinian 
sovereignty over the Jordan valley and the reduction of annexed territories in a manner that 
provided for greater territorial contiguity of the Palestinian state. Israel presented a map 
including a 6% annexation of territory, while the Palestinians proposed a maximum 3.1% 
annexation in combination with a land swap. A corridor, or “permanent safe passage”, 
connecting the West Bank to the Gaza Strip was also foreseen, allowing a link between the 
two Palestinian zones for the movement of people, goods and the provision of services. The 
corridor would not have been sovereign Palestinian territory over a strip of land cutting across 
Israel. The concept of land swaps was also discussed, the Clinton parameters later proposing 
that land swaps between Israeli settlement annexations and territory currently within Israel 
should take place on a 3:1 basis.  
A sustainable two-state solution will necessarily require a viable Palestinian state, which in 
turn calls for Palestine’s territorial contiguity and control over its borders. This implies a state 
along the 1967 cease-fire lines with only minor revisions. It would need also the 
internationally guaranteed “permanent safe passage” corridor between the West Bank and the 
                                                 
6 International Crisis Group (2002a), A Time to Lead: The International Community and the Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict,April, Brussels; and International Crisis Group (2002b), Middle East Endgame I: Getting to a 
Comprehensive Arab-Israeli Peace Settlement;  Middle East Endgame II: How a Comprehensive Israeli-
Palestinian Peace Settlement Would Look, Middle East Endgame III: Israel, Syria and Lebanon – How 
Comprehensive Peace Settlements Would Look, July, Brussels. 
7 R. Pundak (2001),‘From Oslo to Taba: What went wrong?’, Survival, Vol. 43, Autumn.  E MERSON AND TOCCI 
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Gaza Strip. Any land swaps allowing Israel to annex select settlements should attempt to 
maximise the number of settlers but without disrupting the viability of the Palestinian state. 
Following the logic of the UNSC Resolution 242 and the Arab Peace Plan, the annexation of 
settlements areas would be compensated on a 1:1 basis of equal value land. Given Palestinian 
acceptance of a state on 22% of mandatory Palestine, there would be little reason why they 
should be expected to accept an even smaller share. The question of equal value land is 
particularly important since many of the Israeli settlements are constructed on the best 
agricultural land of the West Bank, and located in water shortage areas.
8 Tentative proposals 
for land to be swapped from Israel in favour of the Palestinians include areas adjacent to the 
Gaza Strip and areas southwest of the West Bank. Some Israeli analysts, on the other hand, 
hint at swapping the “little triangle”, an area adjacent to the northwest end of the West Bank, 
which is home to approximately 200,000 Palestinian citizens of Israel. Such proposals are 
motivated by a demographic logic, disregarding the wishes of the people in question. 
Territorial swaps should cause minimal disruption to those legally inhabiting one state or the 
other, unless of course these were to correspond to the wishes of the people in question.  
Remote as it appears at the present time, a re-launching negotiations on the basis of progress 
made up until Taba appears to be the most plausible way to get a just and sustainable 
outcome, and maybe the only way. However the continuing growth of settlements, especially 
in the greater Jerusalem area, is  fundamentally altering the socio-political and economic 
landscape of the region and threatening the likelihood of a future settlement along these lines. 
The only somewhat hopeful signals noted in recent years have been the surveys carried out by 
Israeli research centres and peace organisations, documenting the Israeli public’s growing 
support for the evacuation of settlements as well as the willingness of many settlers to leave, 
provided suitable economic compensation was offered by the government.
9 
Jerusalem. At the Camp David-Taba talks, Israel also broke the taboo over Jerusalem as the 
“undivided capital” of the state of Israel. The notion of Jerusalem as the shared capital of the 
two states was endorsed by both parties. The Clinton parameters set out the general principle 
for the sharing of the city: “What is Arab should be Palestinian and what is Jewish should be 
Israeli. This should apply to the old city as well”. The parties agreed that Jerusalem would be 
an open city with a soft border regime and cooperation and coordination over the provision of 
services and policing.  
With regard to the Holy sites, the Clinton parameters proposed Palestinian sovereignty over 
the Haram al-Sharif and Israeli sovereignty over the Western Wall. Amongst other disputes 
there was disagreement over the precise definition of the latter, as Palestinians made the 
distinction between the Wailing Wall and the rest of the wall of the Haram. Mutual consent 
was foreseen for excavations under the Haram or behind the wall.  
The Clinton parameters concerning the sharing of Jerusalem continue to be a useful reference 
principle for the final status agreement on the issue. However, the ongoing settlement activity 
within the Jerusalem Metropolitan area renders the application of the principle in current 
circumstances increasingly inapplicable. In addition to settlement construction, there has also 
in recent years been an expansion of the Jewish quarter in the Old City. As time passes 
Palestinian East Jerusalem is gradually disappearing.  
Syria and Lebanon. Peace remains to be made between Israel and both Syria and Lebanon, 
even if Israel unilaterally withdrew its forces of occupation from Lebanon in May 2000, such 
                                                 
8 Settler water consumption is 850cm
3 per capita as opposed to Palestinian consumption of 82cm
3 per capita. 
9 Peace Now (2002), Settler Attitudes towards Withdrawal from the Territories, July (www.peace-now.org).  R OAD MAPS AND FINAL DESTINAIONS FOR ISRAEL AND PALESTINE 
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that there is no longer a major territorial issue remaining on this front. The two cases are of 
course connected in several ways: both Syria and Lebanon have Palestinian refugee 
communities; Syria maintains a hegemonic military and political presence in Lebanon, and 
has supported the Hezbollah militias there, and there is a small piece of contested land on the 
Lebanese-Syrian frontier (Cheba farms) where there are still Israeli forces.  
Israel’s outstanding conflict with Syria is over the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights 
since 1967. Apart from the territorial issue are questions of use of water resources and a post-
settlement security regime. Attempts were made to settle the Israeli-Syrian front during the 
1990s, initially in parallel with the Oslo process. These failed to reach agreement, and 
between 1996 and 1999 were effectively suspended. When Barak became Israeli Prime 
Minister, he quickly attempted to achieve a breakthrough with Syria, given the impending 
Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, and President Clinton also became engaged as mediator 
between Barak and Assad. These talks broke down over proposals from Clinton that did not 
wholly restore the 1967 border, and which Assad refused.  
The International Crisis Group (ICG) has proposed draft treaties of peace between Israel and 
Syria and Lebanon,
10 and we see no need to take a different view on their detailed proposals. 
In the draft treaty proposed for Israel and Syria, the border of 4 June 1967 would be restored, 
subject to fine details to be worked out by the UN’s chief cartographer. The area to be vacated 
by Israel would be demilitarised. The US would maintain surveillance and early warning 
facilities, and there would be monitoring by US/EU/Russia. There would be a bilateral Joint 
Water Consultative Committee to regulate the use of water resources.  
In principle the Israeli-Lebanese frontier is not contested since the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, 
and is based on the boundary drawn up in 1923 by the British and French mandatory powers, 
and confirmed in 1949 in the Israeli-Lebanese armistice agreement. Technical details of the 
precise frontier remain to be marked out. The uninhabited Cheba farm area (25 square km) 
involves an arcane element in the Israel-Lebanese-Syrian dossier. At the time of the Israeli 
withdrawal from Lebanon, this small area, formerly part of Syria, was declared to be part of 
Lebanon by both the Lebanese and Syrian authorities. Since the Israeli army had not 
withdrawn from this area, the political argument made by Lebanon and the Hezbollah is that 
the Israeli withdrawal has not been completed. While this small piece of land still has the 
potential to cause a lot of trouble, for example by inducing escalating military clashes, it is 
obvious that upon peace settlements on the two fronts Israel will withdraw from the Cheba 
farms, and Syria and Lebanon will be free to decide together where its future lies. The 
Hezbollah maintain hostilities along the Israel-Lebanese frontier, which seems certain to 
continue until and unless an Israeli-Palestinian peace is agreed.  
The ICG draft treaty proposed for Israel and Lebanon also foresees extensive bilateral 
cooperation between the two countries (economic cooperation, transport and communication 
links, tourism, etc.), exclusion of irregular forces from the frontier zone, maybe an extended 
UNIFIL monitoring mandate on the frontier for a while still, and a Joint Water Consultative 
Board to regulate use of water drawn from the Hasbani River, which flows into Lake Tiberias 
(Sea of Galilee). The importance of the water issue was highlighted once again in the autumn 
of 2002, when Lebanon announced new pumping facilities at the Wazzani springs, which feed 
                                                 
10 International Crisis Group (2002b), Middle East Endgame I: Getting to a Comprehensive Arab-Israeli Peace 
Settlement; Middle East Endgame II: How a Comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian Peace Settlement Would Look, 
Middle East Endgame III: Israel, Syria and Lebanon – How Comprehensive Peace Settlements Would Look, 
July, Brussels.  E MERSON AND TOCCI 
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into the Hasbani river. Sharon declared this to be a casus belli, and diplomats were deployed 
by the US and France to calm the affair down.
11 
Refugees.  The number of Palestinian refugees (original refugees from Israel and their 
descendants) today may be viewed minimally as numbering 1.3 million people in UNRWA 
refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the West Bank and Gaza Strip, or 4 million 
registered by UNRWA in these same locations living in or out of the camps, through to an 
estimated registered 5.9 million if one counts all the families of refugees now residing 
anywhere in the world (Table 1).
12 
Table 1. Palestinian refugee population, as of 2002 
Place of residence  Number 
Israel 276,250 
Gaza Strip  876,196 
West Bank  746,654 
Jordan 1,992,049 
Lebanon 466,628 
Syria 508,845 
Egypt 46,282 
Saudi Arabia  314,239 
Kuwait 39,308 
Other Gulf  120,747 
Iraq, Libya  84,957 
Other Arab countries  6,340 
US 197,913 
Other countries  252,022 
Grand total  5,928,430 
Source: S. Abu-Sitta (1998), The Palestinian Nakba – The Register of 
Depopulated Localities in Palestine, Palestine Return Center, London. 
Figures are updated to 2002, using a 3.5% population growth rate. 
During the Oslo process, negotiations only scratched the surface of the refugee dossier. Israel 
has been unwilling to acknowledge the gross injustice felt by Palestinians at Israel’s refusal to 
accept its responsibilities for the emergence and continuation of the refugee problem. As Ilan 
Pappe (1999) points out, “it is immaterial whether people leave their homes “voluntarily” in 
times of war, or whether they are actually physically forced to leave. What is material is that 
they were never allowed back”.
13 The Palestinians in turn for a long time refused to appreciate 
Israel’s concerns at the prospect of refugee return. The prospect of becoming a minority 
within their state is amongst the greatest collective fears of Israelis. Beyond the specific 
“demographic” concern is the general fear of Arab intentions, especially since the suicide 
bombing campaign of the second intifada.  
While Palestinians cannot be expected to endorse these Israeli fears, it is important that they 
recognise them, as appears to be increasingly the case. In his article in the New York Times 
                                                 
11 International Crisis Group (2002e), Old games, new rules: Conflict on the Israel-Lebanon Border, November, 
Brussels.  
12 T. Salem (2003), Palestinian refugees – How can a durable solution be achieved, Working Paper No. 6 in the 
CEPS Middle East and Euro-Med Project, forthcoming. 
13 I. Pappe (1999), ‘Were They Expelled?: The History, Historiography and Relevance of the Palestinian 
Refugee Problem’, in Ghada Karmi and Eugene Cotran, The Palestinian Exodus, 1948-1988, London: Ithaca 
Press.  R OAD MAPS AND FINAL DESTINAIONS FOR ISRAEL AND PALESTINE 
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on 3 February 2002, Yasser Arafat stated “we understand Israel’s demographic concerns and 
understand that the right to return of Palestinian refugees, a right guaranteed under 
international law and UN Resolution 194, must be implemented in a way that takes into 
account such concerns. However, just as we Palestinians must be realistic with respect to 
Israel’s demographic desires, Israelis too must be realistic in understanding that there can be 
no solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict if the legitimate rights of these innocent civilians 
continue to be ignored.”  
While a full convergence of narratives of the past and the present may never be achieved, it is 
imperative that any agreement encourages an ongoing dialogue between the parties or in 
public debate. This would both contribute to addressing the injustices of the past, to 
encourage an agreement and its implementation and to provide guarantees that the events of 
the past would not be repeated. The Palestinian elites will also have to deepen their dialogue 
with the refugee communities, both hearing their demands and discussing with them realistic 
prospects for the future. Throughout the Oslo period, the PA failed in this respect. The 
refugees were excluded from the political process and no mechanisms to prepare the grounds 
for a just and sustainable solution were established. The refugee communities will need to be 
represented more effectively in the conduct of negotiations on refugees and in the 
implementation of any future agreement. Finally, with the majority of Palestinian refugees 
living in neighbouring countries, and many likely to remain in their present locations, 
negotiations on several of the key issues (numbers of refugees, citizenship, social, economic 
and political rights, development assistance) will have to involve these countries in the 
negotiation processes, bilateral or multilateral.  
The negotiations from Camp David in July 2000 through to Taba in January 2003 did see 
some progress in defining the framework. In particular President Clinton’s “parameters”, 
which he presented in December 2000, set out the logical options that would no doubt return 
to the table with renewed negotiations.
 14 These are:  
1.  Return of refugees to their homes and properties in Israel, 
2.  Return to future Palestinian state, 
3.  Return to territory transferred to Palestine from today’s in Israel, 
4.  Resettlement in the present country of residence and 
5.  Resettlement in third countries. 
The most difficult issue of principle and practice is how to reconcile the right of return with 
Israel’s concerns. An outright quota of a small size decided by Israel would contradict the 
right of return and individual choice. Is it possible to square this circle? This may not be 
completely achieved as any restrictions (whether explicit though quotas or implicit through 
incentives) would represent a departure from the implementation of a right to return to one’s 
own property. However, while rights-holders may not be divested of their rights, others with 
interests and subordinated rights may takes measures (devoid of coercion) to affect the right-
holders’ choice. In other words, while not all refugees would exercise their right of return, 
they would exercise their right to choose. In practice, the closest to a resolution of this issue 
                                                 
14 The Clinton parameters are in essence what were later presented in the Israeli non-paper at the Taba talks. 
According to President Clinton, “Israel is prepared to acknowledge the moral and material suffering caused to 
the Palestinian people as a result of the 1948 war”. On how to handle the Right of Return (ROR), “the president 
knows the history of the issue and how hard it is for the Palestinian leadership to appear to be abandoning this 
principle. At the same time, the Israeli side could not accept any reference to the ROR that would imply a right 
to immigrate to Israel in defiance of Israel’s sovereign policy on admission or that would threaten the Jewish 
character of the state”.   E MERSON AND TOCCI 
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might come from an agreement with Israel over an annual quota of refugee returns, but for an 
open-ended number of years. Such a solution would also work towards addressing over time 
the current Israeli suspicions of the returnees’ political agenda. At the same time, the other 
options of the Clinton parameters would be made explicit in terms of their conditions. When 
the refugees studied all these options, and noted the length of the queue before return to Israel 
might be possible, many would probably turn to the other options. In this way supply and 
demand might be brought into equilibrium on the basis of individual choice.  
For all locations other than Lebanon a large fraction of the total might stay where they are, of 
course, with an end to camp life, regularisation of citizenship (mostly host country, with some 
cases of double Palestinian and host country citizenship), and normalisation of economic, 
social and political status. In Jordan, the 1948 refugees already have Jordanian citizenship and 
they are relatively well integrated. The 1967 refugees could presumably be granted 
citizenship. In Syria the refugees are relatively small in number and fairly well integrated, and 
citizenship could presumably be granted. Most of those with refugee status in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip would presumably become Palestinian citizens with full rights.  
Israel began to discuss how many refugees it would be prepared to accept during the Taba 
talks, for example 25,000 over three years, or 40,000 over five years, according to the 
Moratinos “non-paper”.
15 These numbers were not accepted by the Palestinians. Israel has 
been receiving annual immigration inflows of about 100,000 per year for the last 10 years. 
Box 4. Principles of a possible settlement of the refugee problem 
The mechanism 
•  Step 1. The Refugee Commission explains the conditions attached to each of the options 
(Clinton parameters), so that individual refugees can express their free and informed 
preferences.  
•  Step 2. Refugees indicate their rank-ordered preferences. 
•  Step 3. The Commission analyses preferences of refugees alongside possible destinations. 
•  Step 4. The Commission returns to refugees indicating the possible timetable of 
acceptance by possible destinations (e.g. up to N refugees per year), and priority 
categories (e.g. family reunion cases, camp residents, Lebanon or other, etc). 
•  Step 5. Refugees, having considered this information, may confirm or change their choice 
among the options.  
Development assistance and rehabilitation costs 
Host countries would also be provided with development funds to absorb refugee 
communities. Present UNRWA operations would be transformed into a development fund, as 
camps would be phased out or converted into normal residential housing. Present UNRWA 
budget in the Middle East of $350 million would be transformed, possibly with a temporary 
doubling of the budget, supplemented by other bilateral and multilateral projects.  
Compensation 
Individual compensation would have to be calculated on the basis of the values of the 
property in 1948/67 plus multiplier to be agreed. An international fund would be established. 
Amounts from Israel on the order of $5 to 10 billion have been mentioned in some studies, 
bearing in mind gains from confiscation of refugee properties.  
 
                                                 
15 EU “non-paper” summarising the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks at Taba, January 2001 (as published in 
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For the official “priority” case of Lebanon, the most acute needs are for those still in refugee 
camps, numbering about 200,000. At some point there will have to be a burden-sharing 
“moment of truth” particularly as between Israel, Palestine, Lebanon and the rest of the world. 
Lebanon in general resists the idea of the refugees acquiring permanent right of residence, or 
Lebanese citizenship. Yet many Lebanese refugees retain Lebanon as second preference if 
return to original home is impossible over a reasonably short time horizon (45% in one 
survey). Considering that many Christian and Shi’ite Palestinian refugees have actually 
received Lebanese citizenship (about 100,000), it could be expected that Lebanon offers 
citizenship to some of the other predominantly Sunni refugees. In addition, existing forms of 
legal and practical discrimination would end. A third-best alternative would be that some 
refugees would remain in Lebanon with regular Lebanese residence/employment rights, but as 
foreigners with Palestinian citizenship. These people would have normal rights as Palestinian 
citizens to move at any time to the Palestinian state, but this would be a matter of normal 
individual choice.  
The rights of Palestinian citizens in their host countries should in any case be progressively 
normalised, and protected by Treaty level obligations between the states concerned. Such 
rights could be included in the jurisprudence of a Confederation of the Mashreq, as argued 
above, alongside policies defining the rights and rules for the movement of persons, and their 
residence, employment and acquisition of property.  
Offers from the rest of the world might be related to the actual immigration flows of recent 
years, which amount to a revealed indicator of absorption capacity rather than political 
statements of the type “we are full up”. Hypothetical annual quotas for Palestinian refugees 
from Lebanon, for example of only 1% of total recent number of immigrant inflows for 
Europe and US/Canada/Australia/New Zealand, would build up to 100,000 people over five 
years, or half the Lebanon camp refugee population.
16 A 1% norm is of course arbitrary, 
except to show that a very small number for the countries of immigration could add up to a 
considerable contribution to a solution. A 1% norm would amount to an annual flow of 6,800 
for Western Europe and 13,500 for the new world countries indicated. It also is to be noted 
that these countries at present have open quotas for the reinstallation of refugees from all 
sources of about 100,000 per year, but this number is largely dependent on the huge US 
commitment to 75,000 refugees per year. 
Palestinian citizens of Israel. While not forming part of the agenda of the peace process, 
there is a remaining Palestinian issue of importance internal to Israel. While Israel’s 
democracy is a vibrant one to say the least, it is also an incomplete one. The Palestinian 
citizens of Israel lack constitutionally entrenched guarantees of legal and political equality. 
The actual issues are described in Box 5, and involve serious legal discrimination as well as 
more general problems of relatively disadvantaged development. A rapid normalisation of the 
situation of this community should come with if not before a peace settlement. The EU should 
also make this a condition of deepening its association with Israel.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 Recent immigration inflows from all sources have been 685,000 per year into Western Europe, and 1,350,000 
into the group of new world countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, US).  E MERSON AND TOCCI 
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Box 5. The Palestinian citizens of Israel 
In 1948 there were 900,000 Palestinians living in today’s Israel. With the war 750,000 fled to 
become refugees, with only 150,000 remaining, their families now representing 19% of the 
population of Israel. They have Israeli citizenship in some fundamental respects, including the 
right to have an Israeli passport, to vote in national parliamentary elections and to be member 
of the Knesset. However they are a disadvantaged group compared to the Jewish population, 
suffering legal discrimination in a number of ways, as well as according to the main indicators 
of economic and social development.  
The Palestinian minority lack constitutionally entrenched guarantees of legal equality. The 
Proclamation of Independence speaks of the Palestinian citizens “participating in the 
upbuilding of the State on the basis of full and equal citizenship”, but in the absence of a 
formal constitution this has never been securely entrenched legally, and there are many 
distinctions made in law and policy between the Jews and non-Jews. At least 20 laws 
discriminate against the Palestinian minority, including those that authorise expropriation of 
land and restrict land use and ownership. The Palestinian minority therefore seeks formal 
recognition as a national minority, with full recognition and guarantees for equal citizenship 
and land rights.  
In the past year several legislative proposals have been submitted that would further limit the 
rights of the Palestinian minority. These concern the ejection of Bedouin villagers off 
farmlands, exclusion from national referenda, denial of citizenship to spouses of Palestinian 
citizens, and – most alarming of all – even a bill to legalise the physical transfer of 
Palestinians from Israel to the West Bank or Gaza. While these bills have not been passed, 
they are indicative of what is debated in Israeli politics and of the climate of growing friction 
between the communities, aggravated by the reciprocal violence of the second intifada.  
The socio-economic situation of the Palestinian citizens is disadvantaged compared to the 
Jewish community, although on average more favourable than for most Palestinians in the 
West Bank and Gaza. The average monthly salary is 60% of that of the Jewish population. 
The level of educational achievement is lower, for example with an 18% qualification rate for 
university admission, compared to 40% for the Jewish population. Underdevelopment is 
extreme in the so-called unrecognised Bedouin villages. Out of 46 such villages in the Negev 
and north of Israel, eight have been recognised in recent years, but the remainders are 
disqualified from receiving municipal services. 
Source: S. Kamm, with R. Rinawi, S. Abbasi, J. Farer, A. Faris, A. Nahhas-Daoud and J. Ayoub 
(2003), The Arab Minority in Israel – Implications for the Middle East Conflict, Working 
Paper No. 8 in the CEPS Middle East and Euro-Med Project, forthcoming.  17 
ANNEX 1 
[DRAFT] A PERFORMANCE-BASED ROAD MAP TO A PERMANENT TWO-STATE SOLUTION TO 
THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT 
20 DECEMBER 2002 
The following is a performance-based and goal driven road map, with clear phases, timelines, target 
dates, and benchmarks aiming at progress through reciprocal steps by the two parties in the political, 
security, economic, humanitarian, and institution-building fields, under the auspices of the Quartet. 
The destination is a final and comprehensive settlement of the Israel-Palestinian conflict by 2005, as 
presented in President Bush’s speech of 24 June, and welcomed by the EU, Russia, and the UN in the 
16 July and 17 September Quartet Ministerial statements. 
A two state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will only be achieved through an end to violence 
and terrorism, when the Palestinian people have a leadership acting decisively against terror and 
willing able to build a practising democracy based on tolerance and liberty, and through Israeli’s 
readiness to do what is necessary for a democratic Palestinian state to be established, and a clear, 
unambiguous acceptance by both parties of the goal of a negotiated settlement as described below. The 
Quartet will assist and facilitate implementation of the plan, starting in Phase I, including direct 
discussions between the parties as required. The plan establishes a realistic timeline for 
implementation. However, as a performance-based plan, progress will require and depend upon the 
good faith efforts of the parties, and their compliance with each of the obligations outlined below. 
Should the parties perform their obligations rapidly, progress within and through the phases may come 
sooner than indicated in the plan. Non-compliance with obligations will impede progress.  
A settlement, negotiated between the parties, will result in the emergence of an independent, 
democratic, and viable Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with Israel and its 
other neighbours. The settlement will resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict, and end the occupation 
that began in 1967, based on the foundations on the Madrid Conference, the principle of land for 
peace, UNSCRs 242, 338 and 1397, agreements previously reached by the parties, and the initiative of 
Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah – endorsed by the Beirut Arab League Summit – calling for acceptance 
of Israel as a neighbour living in peace and security, in the context of a comprehensive settlement. 
This initiative is a vital element of international efforts to promote a comprehensive peace on all 
tracks, including the Syrian-Israeli and Lebanese-Israeli tracks.  
The Quartet will meet regularly at senior levels to evaluate the parties’ performance on 
implementation of the plan. In each phase, the parties are expected t perform their obligations in 
parallel, unless otherwise indicated.  
Phase I: Present to May 2003 
Ending Terror and Violence, Normalising Palestinian Life, 
and Building Palestinian Institutions 
In Phase I. the Palestinians immediately undertake and unconditional cessation of violence according 
to the steps outlined below; such action should be accompanied by supportive measures undertaken by 
Israel. Palestinians and Israelis resume security cooperation based on the Tenet work plan to end 
violence, terrorism, and incitement through restructured and effective Palestinian security services. 
Palestinian undertake comprehensive political reform in preparation for statehood, including drafting a 
Palestinian constitution, and free, fair and open elections upon the basis of those measures. Israel takes 
all necessary steps to help normalise Palestinian life. Israel withdraws from Palestinian areas occupied 
from September 28, 2000 and the two sides restore the status quo that existed at that time, as security 
performance and cooperation progress. Israel also freezes all settlement activity, consistent with the 
Mitchell report.  
At the outset of Phase I:  
•  Palestinian leadership issues unequivocal statement reiterating Israel’s right to exist in peace and 
security and calling for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire to end armed activity and all  E MERSON AND TOCCI 
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acts of violence against Israelis anywhere. All official Palestinian institutions end incitement 
against Israel.  
•  Israeli leadership issues unequivocal statement affirming its commitments to the two-state vision 
of an independent, viable, sovereign Palestinian state living in peace and security alongside Israel, 
as expressed by President Bush, and calling for an immediate end to violence against Palestinian 
everywhere. All official Israeli institutions end incitement against Palestinians.  
Security 
•  Palestinians declare an unequivocal end to violence and terrorism and undertake visible efforts on 
the ground to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conduction and planning violent 
attacks on Israelis anywhere.  
•  Rebuilt and refocused Palestinian Authority security apparatus begins sustained, targeted, and 
effective operations aimed at confronting all those engaged in terror and dismantlement of terrorist 
capabilities and infrastructure. This includes commencing confiscation of illegal weapons and 
consolidation of security authority, free of association with terror and corruption.  
•  GOI takes no actions undermining trust, including deportations, attack on civilians; confiscation 
and/or demolition of Palestinian homes and property, as a punitive measure or to facilitate Israeli 
construction; destruction of Palestinian institutions and infrastructure; and other measures 
specified in the Tenet Work Plan.  
•  Relying on existing mechanisms and on-the ground resources, Quartet representatives begin 
informal monitoring and consult with the parties on establishment of a formal monitoring 
mechanism and its implementation.  
•  Implementation, as previously agreed, of U.S. rebuilding, training and resumed security 
cooperation plan in collaboration with outside oversight board (U.S. - Egypt - Jordan). Quartet 
support for efforts to achieve a lasting, comprehensive cease-fire.  
-  All Palestinian security organisations are consolidated into three services reporting to an 
empowered Interior Minister. 
-  Restructured/retained Palestinian security forces and IDF counterparts progressively resume 
security cooperation and other undertakings in implementation of the Tenet work plan, 
including regular senior-level meetings, with the participation of U.S. security officials. 
•  Arab states cut off public and private funding and all other forms of support for groups supporting 
and engaging in violence and terror.  
•  All donors providing budgetary support for the Palestinians channel these funds through the 
Palestinian Ministry of Finance’s Single Treasury Account.  
•  As comprehensive security performance moves forward, IDF withdraws progressively from areas 
occupied since September 28, 2000 and the two sides restore the status quo that existed prior to 
September 28, 2000. Palestinian security forces re-deploy to areas vacated by IDF.  
Palestinian Institution Building  
•  Immediate action on credible process to produce draft constitution for Palestinian statehood. As 
rapidly as possible, constitutional committee circulates draft Palestinian constitution, based on 
strong parliamentary democracy and cabinet with empowered prime minister, for public 
comment/debate. Constitutional building proposes draft document for submission after elections 
for approval by appropriate Palestinian institutions.  
•  Appointment of interim prime minister or cabinet with empowered executive authority/decision-
making body.   R OAD MAPS AND FINAL DESTINAIONS FOR ISRAEL AND PALESTINE 
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•  GOI fully facilitates travel of Palestinian officials for PLC and Cabinet sessions, internationally 
supervised security retraining, electoral and other reform activity, and other supportive measures 
related to the reform efforts.  
•  Continued appointment of Palestinian ministers empowered to undertake fundamental reform. 
Completion of further steps to achieve genuine separation of powers, including any necessary 
Palestinian legal reforms for this purpose.  
•  Establishment or independent Palestinian election commission. PLC reviews and revises elections 
law.  
•  Palestinian performance on judicial, administrative, and economic benchmarks, as established by 
the International Task Force on Palestinian Reform.  
•  As early as possible, and based upon the above measures and in the context of open debate and 
transparent candidate selection/electoral campaign based on a free, multiparty process, 
Palestinians hold free, open, and fair elections.  
•  GOI facilitates Task Force election assistance, registration of voters, movement of candidates and 
voting officials. Support for NGOs involved in the election process.  
•  GOI reopens Palestinian Chamber of Commerce and other closed Palestinian institutions in East 
Jerusalem based on a commitment that these institutions operate strictly in accordance with prior 
agreements between the parties.  
Humanitarian response 
•  Israel takes measures to improve the humanitarian situation. Israel and Palestinians implement in 
full all recommendations of the Bertini report to improve humanitarian conditions, lifting curfews, 
and easing restrictions on movement of persons and goods, and allowing full, safe, and unfettered 
access of international and humanitarian personnel.  
•  AHLC reviews the humanitarian situation and prospects for economic development in the West 
Bank and Gaza and launches a major donor assistance effort, including to the reform effort.  
•  GOI and PA continue revenue clearance process and transfer of funds, including areas, in 
accordance with agreed, transparent monitoring mechanism.  
Civil society  
•  Continued donor support, including increased funding through PVOs/NGOs, for people to people 
programs, private sector development and civil society initiatives.  
Settlements GOI immediately dismantles settlement outposts erected since March 2001.  
•  Consistent with the Mitchell Report, GOI freezes all settlement activity (including natural growth 
of settlements).  
Phase II: June – December 2003 
Transition 
In the second phase, efforts are focused on the option of creating an independent Palestinian state with 
provisional borders and attributes of sovereignty, based on the new constitution, as a way station to a 
permanent status settlement. As has been noted, this goal can be achieved when the Palestinian people 
have a leadership acting decisively against terror, willing and able to build a practising democracy 
based on tolerance and liberty. With such a leadership, reformed civil institutions and security 
structures, the Palestinians will have the active support of the Quartet and the broader international 
community in establishing an independent, viable, state.   E MERSON AND TOCCI 
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Progress into Phase II will be based upon the consensus judgement of the Quartet of whether 
conditions are appropriate to proceed, taking into account performance of both parties. Furthering and 
sustaining efforts to normalise Palestinian lives and build Palestinian institutions, Phase II starts after 
Palestinian elections and ends with possible creation of an independent Palestinian state with 
provisional borders in 2003. Its primary goals are continued comprehensive security performance and 
effective security cooperation, continued normalisation of Palestinian life and institution-building, 
further building on and sustaining of the goals outlined in Phase I, ratification of a democratic 
Palestinian constitution, formal establishment of office of prime minister, consolidation of political 
reform, and the creation of a Palestinian state with provisional borders. 
Phase III: 2004-2005  
Permanent Status Agreement and 
End of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
Progress into Phase III, based on consensus judgement of Quartet, and taking into account actions of 
both parties and Quartet monitoring. Phase III objectives are consolidation of reform and stabilisation 
of Palestinian institutions, sustained, effective Palestinian security performance, and Israeli-Palestinian 
negotiations aimed at a permanent status agreement in 2005.  
•  Second International Conference: Convened by Quartet, in consultation with the parties, at 
beginning of 2004 to endorse agreement reached on an independent Palestinian state with 
provisional borders and formally to launch a process with the active, sustained, and operational 
support of the Quartet, leading to a final, permanent status resolution in 2005, including on 
borders, Jerusalem, refugees, settlements; and, to support progress toward a comprehensive 
Middle East settlement between Israel and Lebanon and Israel and Syria, to be achieved as soon as 
possible.  
•  Continued comprehensive, effective progress on the reform agenda laid out by the Task Force in 
preparation for final status agreement.  
•  Continued sustained and effective security performance, and sustained, effective security 
cooperation on the basis laid out in Phase I. 
•  International efforts to facilitate reform and stabilise Palestinian institutions and the Palestinian 
economic, in preparation for final status agreement.  
•  Parties reach final and comprehensive permanent status agreement that ends the Israel – 
Palestinian conflict in 2005, through a settlement negotiated between the parties based on UNSCR 
242, 338, and 1397, that ends the occupation that began in 1967, and includes an agreed, just, fair, 
and realistic solution to the refugee issue, and a negotiated resolution on the status of Jerusalem 
that takes into account the political and religious concerns of both sides, and protects the religious 
interests of Jews, Christians, and Muslims world-wide, and fulfils the vision of two states, Israel 
and sovereign, independent, democratic and viable Palestine, living side-by-side in peace and 
security.  
•  Arab state acceptance of full normal relations with Israel and security for all the states of the 
region in the context of a compressive Arab-Israeli peace. 
 
Source: The above text has not been officially published but is available on www.bitterlemons.org/docs.html. 
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